

Nuclear security in The Netherlands


VROM  **Inspectorate**

Inspectorate of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning
and the Environment
Department of Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards

dr. P.J.W.M. (Piet) Muskens
DIRECTOR

Rijnstraat 8
P.O. box 16191
2500 BD Den Haag
Internal P.O. box 560
The Netherlands

Phone +31 (0)70 - 339 46 85
Fax +31 (0)70 - 339 18 87
piet.muskens@minvrom.nl
www.vrom.nl



→ Contents

- Worldwide reasons for security
- Leading role of IAEA
- The Dutch approach to nuclear security
- Security review in the Netherlands
- Results of security review
- Dilemma's
- Conclusions and recommendations

→ World wide reasons for security

- World Trade Centre
(almost 3000 victims)
- Public transport Madrid and London
(about 200 and 55 victims)
- Bali (about 200 victims)
- Research reactor Australia (prevented)

→ Leading role of IAEA

- march 2005, ElBaradei (dg IAEA):
statement on the necessity of nuclear security
- februari 2005, Moscow, Tanaguchi (ddg IAEA)
“The question is not to operate a NPP safely but to operate a NPP securely”
- CPPNM (amended july 2005)
- Security services: IPPAS mission

→ The Dutch approach to nuclear security

- Synergy safety & security (& safeguards)
- Clear responsibilities of licensee and government
- Continuous improvement
- Defence in depth



Security review in Netherlands

- IPPAS (int) and COT (nat) mission
 - review december 2005;
 - final reports june 2006
- DBT for power plant Borsele
to be accepted by the three responsible ministers
- programme for improvement of security
with all parties concerned



Results of security review (1)

GOOD PRACTICES OF THE NPP BORSELE

- Bunkered system and secondary control room well designed and provide robustness against sabotage scenario
- Guard force management demonstrated high level of commitment
- Door locking to sensitive areas from remote alarm areas
- Documented procedures to shut down reactor in the event of vital area penetration



Results of security review (2)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Determine if more staff is necessary
- Make an actual DBT and involve politicians
- Actualize legislation
- Update security regulations to current INFCIRC/225
- Improve the response force
- Improve the inspections



Results of security review (3)

QUICK WINS

- Trespassing criminal offence
- Graded approach in access control
- Limited entry to vital areas
- Personnel, vehicle & cargo checks
- Locking door turbine to control room
- Checking load vehicles prior to shipment

→ dilemma's (1)

armed guards
versus
unarmed guards with response by special forces



→ dilemma's (2)

size of the observation area
versus
the use of public roads



→ dilemma's (3)

freedom of demonstration *versus* security

Greenpeace was on top of the reactor in may 2005





Conclusions and recommendations

- IPPAS helpful in improving security
- Comparison with other industries is vital for politicians
- The same procedure will be followed for other nuclear plant and installations in The Netherlands
- International harmonization of security NI's